

# On the Expressivity of the Propositional Fragment of Independence Friendly Logic

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Independence friendly (IF) logic, introduced by Hintikka and Sandu [2], extends classical first order logic by considering imperfect information in otherwise classical evaluation games. The semantics of IF logics is thus based on a game theoretical interpretation of logical connectives, where the truth of a formula is defined as existence of a winning strategy for the initial player (Proponent) and its falsity by existence of a winning strategy of the second player (Opponent). Imperfect information entails a loss of determinacy; i.e., none of the player may have a winning strategy. Equilibrium semantics (see [4]) interprets IF logic as a many-valued logic, where the truth values are identified with equilibrium pay off values that arise if the players are allow to play mixed strategies.

Imperfect information was originally introduced for the game theoretical interpretation of quantifiers: e.g., an existential quantifier occurrence corresponds to a move, where Proponent chooses a witnessing element from the domain of the model. But it can be applied already on the propositional level. Here, we confine ourselves to the minimal version of propositional IF logic introduced, e.g., in [5], which introduces formulas expressing independence of disjunctions from immediately preceding conjunctions and, likewise, independence of conjunctions from immediately preceding disjunctions. This is accomplished by extending the standard propositional syntax by slashed formula. E.g.,  $(\varphi_1 \vee / \wedge \psi_1) \wedge (\varphi_2 \vee / \wedge \psi_2)$  expresses that Proponent has to choose either the right or the left disjunct without knowing to which of the conjuncts was previously chosen by the Opponent. The semantic game for this formula is the simplest (non-trivial) case of incomplete information as we can see from its strategic form (Opponent chooses a row, Proponent independently chooses a column and the payoff is given by the value of the corresponding formula):

$$\begin{array}{c|cc} \mathbf{O} \backslash \mathbf{P} & L & R \\ \hline L & \left( \|\varphi_1\| & \|\psi_1\| \right) \\ R & \left( \|\varphi_2\| & \|\psi_2\| \right) \end{array}$$

In [1] we combined such games with Giles's game for Łukasiewicz logic in order to obtain meet a standard objection regarding intermediary 'degrees of truth', namely that they are intrinsically arbitrary. By identifying atomic formulas of Łukasiewicz logic with complex IF formulas, we obtain an interpretation of intermediary truth values as equilibrium values arising in imperfect information games involving only classical atomic formulas.

An important question in this context is, whether IF logic is rich enough to cover a sufficient range of truth values. Equilibrium semantics for IF logic refers to constant-sum, two-player games with 0 and 1 as the only possible payoff values. It is a well known game-theoretic fact that the value of every such game is rational, hence the values of IF formulas under equilibrium semantics must be rationals from the interval  $[0, 1]$ . We therefore have to ask, whether there exists for any  $q \in [0, 1] \cap \mathbb{Q}$  an IF formula  $\varphi$  such that the value of  $\varphi$  is  $q$ . Mann, Sandu and Sevenster in [3] deal with this question within the framework of first order IF logic.

Our first result is a solution of the above problem within the framework of minimal propositional IF logic. We prove that for any  $q \in [0, 1] \cap \mathbb{Q}$  there is a propositional IF formula  $\varphi$  such that the value of  $\varphi$  is  $q$ . In fact we need just a fragment of propositional IF  $\{W, \neg, \top, \perp\}$ , where  $W$  is the formula corresponding to the slashed disjunction mentioned above,  $W(\varphi_1, \psi_1, \varphi_2, \psi_2) = (\varphi_1 \vee / \wedge \psi_1) \wedge (\varphi_2 \vee / \wedge \psi_2)$ . Our second result shows that this set of connectives of propositional IF logic is functionally complete with respect to all functions from  $\{0, 1\}^n$  to  $[0, 1] \cap \mathbb{Q}$ , i.e. for any such function  $f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$  there is a formula  $\varphi$  containing just  $W, \neg, \top, \perp$  such that for any classical valuation  $v$  it holds that  $f(v(x_1), \dots, v(x_n)) = \|\varphi\|_v$ . We think that the corresponding proofs are of wider interest and will discuss various prospects for extending our findings.

## References

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